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Abstract
We analyse how market competition in a vertically di¤erentiated pol-
luting industry is a¤ected by product variants that comply at di¤erent
levels with "green" social norms. A green consumption behaviour is con-
sidered as a byword of good citizenship. Consumer preferences depend
on a combination of hedonic quality and compliance with the norms. As-
suming that the high hedonic quality variant complies less with the norms
than the low hedonic quality one, we characterize the di¤erent equilibrium
congurations, depending on the perceived intensity of such norms. Then,
we focus on the role that institutions may have in using these norms to
reduce pollution emissions.
Keywords: Social norms, Hedonic quality, environmental quality, rela-
tive preferences, vertical di¤erentiation.
JEL Classication: D62, L13; H13.
"To secure her daughter a position on her high school cheerlead-
ing team, Wanda Webb Holloway solicited a man to kill the mother
of her daughters chief rival, hoping that the mothers death would
distract the rival from the competition. In Japan, enough people
work themselves to death that the culture has a name for this means
of dying: karoshi. [...] ." (McAdams, 1992, p. 2)
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1 Introduction
Many are the situations in which people do not pursue an absolute end, but a
relative position among peers. "Ms. Holloway sought for her daughter elevated
status and popularity among her classmates, while the Japanese workers seek
elevated rank and prestige among their coworkers. The lesson of these two
examples is that for some, social position is an end literally worth killing or dying
for." (McAdams, 1992, p. 3). Typically, such a social recognition is obtained
through positional goods which enrich the buyer with some social/psychological
benets beyond the mere material value.1
In this paper, we rst examine how the existence of positional concerns af-
fects competition in a vertical di¤erentiated industry in which producers pollute
at di¤erent levels. In particular, we consider the existence of social norms that
may induce consumers to prefer the less polluting product, although of lower
intrinsic quality. Then, we draw policy implications by taking into account the
possibility that the government may inuence the penetration of such social
norm.
In order to motivate our approach, we start by considering the positional
content of environmentally friendly products vs. brown alternatives (Goldstein
et al. 2008; Allcott, 2011). In recent years, people have become increasingly
aware of the impact of their consumption choices on the environment. At large,
every consumption decision may contribute to either protect or damage the
environment, thereby a¤ecting not only the quality of life of the consumer, but
also of her family, friends, and colleagues.
When buying "green" products, people feel that they comply with a social
norm for which such a green consumption behavior is a byword of good citizen-
ship. As a consequence, an environmentally friendly product may contribute to
satisfy the desire to stand out as a good citizen and of being socially worthy
(Ostrom, 2000). At the opposite, when buying "brown" products, consumers
may incur a social stigma as they fail to comply with the norm of responsible
citizens. In other words, green consumerism helps reaching the status of good
citizenship, while an opposite result may be obtained though the consumption
of brown goods.
Moreover, the lower the pollution emission as compared to other products,
the higher the contribution to the environmental protection and thus the so-
cial/psychological benet derived by the compliance with the norm for the
green consumer. Symmetrically, the social stigma is wider, the more pollut-
ing the good compared with the green product: the environmental quality gap
between variant is thus a measure of the positive (or negative) contribution of
people to the environmental protection. It is the products relative position on
1This behavior is well described by the theory of conspicuous consumption in which con-
sumers utility partially depends on the comparison between the own consumption and that
of others. Under conspicuous consumption, buyers are willing to pay a higher price for a
functionally equivalent good in order to reveal their wealth and/or or other characteristics
alike. Moreover, they can be induced to purchase either for invidious comparison, namely to
distinguish themselves from the others, or for pecuniary emulation, namely to be considered
as members of a group.
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the environmental quality ladder that denes the individuals relative position
on the social ladder.
Rather interestingly, in spite of the increasing evidence about the environ-
mental impacts of consumers purchase decisions, there is also evidence of a gap
between such green awareness and the actual consumption behavior. One of the
main reasons is that brown goods are usually not only cheaper, but they still
perform better than their green alternatives (Carrigan and Attalla, 2001, Gupta
and Ogden 2009, Weatherell et al., 2003). A typical example is the car sector,
in which combustible vehicles dominate electric or hybrid vehicles in terms of
safety standard and pure engine performance. Based on intrinsic quality con-
siderations, there would be no competition at all. However, the importance
attached to the environmental performance may revert such conventional rank-
ing. In spite of the neoclassical approach to utility-maximization, there can be
a trade-o¤ between utility derived from preferred characteristics of a product
and the social pressure to buy greenin a community. "If a consumer buys a
product which lacks any environmental friendly characteristics, he might have
a bad conscience because environmental awareness is expected from him. His
environmental attitude is inuenced by friends, parents, partners, or by the
media..." (Conrad, 2005, p. 2).
These considerations constitute the two basic ingredients of the model devel-
oped hereafter. First of all, we argue that due to the existence of environmental
social norms, green and brown products are perceived as positional.2 As im-
mediate consequence, the benet derived from consuming the green good (resp.
the brown good) depends on its environmentally friendly (resp. unfriendly)
quality relative to the brown (resp. green) product: the larger the environmen-
tal quality gap between goods, the larger the positional gap along the social
ladder. Second, the social component of consumption can possibly be in conict
with the individual-rationality-based motive so that consumers hesitate between
privileging either some intrinsic features of the good (like its performance) or
its environmental quality.
In order to formalize the above evoked ingredients, we consider a vertically
di¤erentiated duopoly in which the pure performance of the product determines
its hedonic quality. As in standard models of vertical di¤erentiation, the high
quality variant performs better than the other. However, the low quality variant
is less polluting than the other, and this is perceived by consumers as a social
benet (Lombardini-Riipinen, 2005; García-Gallego and Georgantzís, 2009). On
the contrary, when buying the high-but-brown quality, consumers incur a social
stigma, as they increase the environment degradation thereby failing to comply
with the norm.
We introduce both the social stigma and the social benet in the utility func-
tion: they increase with the environmental quality gap between variants, given
that the two variants comply di¤erently with the social norm. This point de-
serves attention. When products are quality-di¤erentiated, people dene their
2Notice that in this approach, the positional content of goods immediately derives from the
social norm: to the extent that a good complies (resp. does not) with the norm, it provides
a social benet (resp. social frustration).
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consumption choice taking into account the satisfaction derived from the intrin-
sic characteristics of the products, given by hedonic qualities and prices. Ceteris
paribus, the higher the quality of its variant, the larger the market share. Here
the shopping decisions contribute to dene the social traits of an individual
through a mechanism of social inclusion/exclusion: buying a green vehicle puts
the driver among the green consumers, while distancing him from those who
buy dirty cars. This social inclusion/exclusion mechanism is stronger, the wider
the quality gap between variants.
We would like to stress that our paper has no direct relationship with current
environmental regulations adopted by specic countries, being only concerned
with the existence of a social norms shared among people. Take as an example
the emissions standards set by the European Union for combustible vehicles.
Although two di¤erent types of vehicles may comply with such standards, their
emissions levels may not be the same. From a regulatory viewpoint both vehicles
are "su¢ ciently" green and therefore do not incur any circulation restriction.
However, from the consumer viewpoint the less pollutant vehicle is considered
as the green one, and it entails a positive social image.
We capture this phenomenon by introducing relative preferences in the stan-
dard model of quality di¤erentiation. In other words, we assume that the utility
from consuming a variant is also depending on the environmental quality gap
between this variant and the other available in the market.3 While this assump-
tion enables to capture the social role of shopping in enhancing environments
protection, it makes the solution to the consumption dilemma between two vari-
ants di¤erent in terms of both hedonic quality and pollution far from being
evident. Indeed, increasing the hedonic quality of a variant does not guarantee
a priori an increase in its demand at equilibrium, as long as a higher perfor-
mance is obtained at the expenses of the environment. Rather, if consumers
are strongly environmentally concerned, it may happen that they prefer to buy
low-but-green hedonic quality good, even if sold at the same price!
The introduction of relative preferences generates a trade-o¤ between hedo-
nic quality and environmental quality. The existence of such trade-o¤ represents
the building block of our theoretical model, and its solution will have interest-
ing policy implications. We start by analyzing how such preferences a¤ect the
equilibrium market congurations while taking into account some specic mar-
ket features. In particular, we develop the analysis in (i) low-income countries
(or regions), where both the average income and the highest willingness to pay
for the hedonic quality variant are rather low, and (ii) high income countries,
where consumers are endowed with high average income.4 These two levels of
3 In his pioneristic paper, Akerlof (1997) states the satisfaction of a consumer increases with
the di¤erence between the personal status and others status. Later, Alexopoulos and Sapp
(2006) and Reichmann (2006) analyze relative preferences from the rms standpoint. These
preferences are also labeled "other-regarding preferences".
4The willingness to pay is usually proportional to the consumers income (Gabszewicz and
Thisse, 1979). In a di¤erent view, the analysis can be interpreted in terms of heterogeneity
among consumers, namely the gap between the lowest and the highest willingness to pay for
a good. When embracing this perspective, by keeping the density of consumersdistribution
constant, the heterogeneity can be used as a proxy for the income dispersion in a country and
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analysis enable to identify some country-specic properties of the equilibrium
congurations and to detail the role of institutions depending on the country
where they act.
In the rst part of the paper, we show that there are circumstances where the
traditional assumption of rationality based-behavior may constitute a too dras-
tic simplication of consumption decisions. This may have misleading implica-
tions at the equilibrium analysis.5 Indeed, the existence of a conict between the
value attributed to the hedonic quality and the positional satisfaction deriving
from consuming an environmentally friendly good may change the equilibrium
market conguration compared to the traditional setting of vertically di¤erenti-
ated goods. In particular, we prove that there exist circumstances in which the
producer of the low-but-green variant quotes a higher price than the rival due
to the perceived (and highly appreciated) superior environmental performance.
Thus, at this duopoly equilibrium, a price switch is observed compared with the
conventional wisdom that the high quality good is sold at a higher price than
the competing variant. Furthermore, we nd that, whenever the intensity of
the relative preferences is su¢ ciently high, a market-monopolization e¤ect takes
place so that only the green rm is active on the market, the brown competitor
being kicked out from the market. Nevertheless, at this monopoly equilibrium
conguration, it may well happen that for extremely high intensity of relative
preferences, the green monopolist extends the market coverage farther than
what we typically observe in a vertically di¤erentiated setting, thereby inducing
a market-coverage e¤ect.
In the second part of the paper we draw interesting policy considerations
through a welfare analysis. More precisely, we evaluate how the intensity of
these relative preferences may be a¤ected by institutions that aim at reducing
polluting emissions. In particular, we assume that the government can endorse
some (relatively) costly environmental campaigns seeking to increase consumers
environmental awareness, thereby amplifying the social/psychological compo-
nent derived from consuming the green variant. To this regard, we account for
recent evidence gathered worldwide of an increasing trend of public authorities
launching campaigns which advertise the detrimental e¤ects on the environ-
ment of consumption habits. For example, "Generation Awake", the recent
awareness-raising campaign created by the European Commission, includes a
consumption guide to help understand and rank the impact on the environment
of di¤erent products and daily habits.6 There are also other environmental edu-
cation initiatives at national and regional level, like the "Cambia la lampadina"
spot in 2010 developed in Italy by the Ministry of the Environment, comparing
consumption of incandescent light bulbs versus low-energy consumption light
bulbs.
thus enables to consider how the equilibrium conguration changes with the dispersion among
consumers.
5Ben-Elhadj et al. (2014) analyse the implications of this assumption in a vertical di¤er-
entiation setting.
6See http://www.generationawake.eu/en/ for details.
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We nd that the e¤ect of such campaigns magnifying the role of social norms
can be welfare improving. Further, in some circumstances (which are proved to
be country-specic), they may even enable the low-but-green quality producer
to expand its market share to a further extent than in the typical equilibrium
conguration arising in vertical di¤erentiation. This happens when the social
norm is so ingrained in the consumers habit that she may refrain from buying
the high-but-brown quality in order to avoid the social stigma coming from
it. Reinforcing the social component of consumption, the policy maker may
squeeze the brown producers market to the extent that emissions coming from
the brown good tend to zero. Interestingly, this positive e¤ect of pollution
emissions abatement is obtained while keeping in the market the polluting rm
and thus preserving the competition in the market.
2 Our paper in the literature
Recently, an increasing attention has been devoted to the impact of environmen-
tal awareness on market equilibrium.7 However, to the best of our knowledge,
we are the rst to combine in a unied setting of vertical di¤erentiation the
notion of relative preferences and the possibility of a conict between such pref-
erences and traditional hedonic qualities. In this perspective, we complement
the paper by Conrad (2005) and that by Ben Elhadj and Tarola (2014), thus
contributing to this strand of the environmental literature.
Conrad (2005) considers the trade-o¤ between the utility derived from the
preferred characteristics of a product and the moral behavior of "buying green".8
He considers a horizontal di¤erentiation setting to analyze a two stage game
where rms dene the environmental characteristic of goods in the rst stage,
thereby competing in price in the second stage. We share the view that en-
vironmental concerns may modify the traditional consumerspreferences and,
accordingly, it should be directly incorporated into the utility function. Never-
theless, we depart from this model as our analysis is conceived in a vertically
di¤erentiated setting. We embrace the view that the environmental quality is
perceived by consumers as a positive characteristic of the product. Therefore,
they are willing to pay a higher price for the green good.9 Finally, far from
Conrad (2005), we assume that both the social benet and stigma increase with
7See Conrad, 2005; Eriksson, 2004; García-Gallego and Georgantzís, 2009; Moraga-
Gonzalez and Padro-Fumero, 2002; Nyborg et al., 2006; Rodriguez-Ibeas, 2007; Ben Elhadj
and Tarola, 2014, inter alia.
8More recently, Coad et al. (2009) consider the processes of adoption of proenvironmental
innovations by individual consumers. They point out that as environmental protection is a
public good, not all agents can be willing to preserve environment. In this view, they wonder
whether the Government policy may thus intervene to sustain adoption of environmental
innovations such as environmentally-friendly cars. Although they are mainly concerned with
the notion of public good, their discussion on intrinsic motivation and environmental morale
provides useful insights to our analysis.
9See Farhar and Houston, 1996; Green Gauge Report, 2000; Levin, 1990; Wasik, 1996;
Lombardini-Riipinen, 2005, and García-Gallego and Georgantzís; 2009.
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the environmental quality gap between variants.10
Ben Elhadj and Tarola (2014) is instead developed in a vertically di¤eren-
tiated setting, like ours. Also, we are close to the authors in the approach of
relative preferences as they formalize that people seek a relative position among
peers and buy products also because of their social value. In their paper, the
relative position of a buyer in the social ladder is depending on the relative po-
sition of the variant he/she buys along the quality ladder: the larger the quality
gap between variants, the larger their positional gap along the quality ladder
and consequently the gap between buyers along the social ladder. Still, they
are only concerned with circumstances such that a variant is simultaneously of
higher hedonic quality and more environmentally friendly than the alternative.
Accordingly, it never arises a conict for the consumer between the hedonic
quality of a variant and the social image it can confer to him/her when dening
his/her consumption choice. We complement their analysis by introducing this
conict into the utility function.
Finally, departing from both Conrad (2005) and Ben Elhadj and Tarola
(2014), we analyse the role of institutions in a¤ecting consumersdecisions by
educational programs that somehow inform consumers about their choicesim-
pact on the environment. By introducing this policy instrument, we broaden
the scope for government intervention against global pollution, which is typ-
ically relegated by the literature to taxes and subsidies.11 In this vein, our
paper is related with a recent literature supporting environmental/informative
campaigns as a policy instrument to supplement and/or substitute traditional
environmental policies like taxation. Two related papers are those by Sartze-
takis et al. (2012) and Mantovani and Vergari (2014). In the rst contribution
the information campaign is always an e¢ cient complementary policy because it
reduces the asymmetry of information between consumers and manufacturers.
In Mantovani and Vergari (2014), on the contrary, the e¢ ciency of the two policy
instruments, environmental campaign vs. taxation, crucially depends on con-
sumersenvironmental awareness. García-Gallego and Georgantzís (2009 and
2010) argue that increasing consumersecological awareness may be socially un-
desirable. In the rst paper, this is due to possible changes in market structure;
in the second paper, the desirability depends on the target of the campaign:
increasing the willingness to pay of the most environmentally conscious con-
sumers is privately protable (but socially unprotable), whereas increasing the
willingness to pay of the least environmentally conscious consumers is socially
protable (but privately unprotable). Their conclusion is that the state cannot
rely on private campaigns.12
We contribute to the above literature by showing that these campaigns can
be socially welfare improving when the realistic assumption of a conict in
10We will discuss at lenght how our utility function di¤ers from the one that he modeled.
11See, among others, Moraga-Gonzales and Padron-Fumero (2002), Lombardini-Riipinen
(2005) and Deltas et al. (2013) for contributions on optimal tax policy with environmental
quality.
12See for instance van der Made and Schoonbeek (2009) for the e¤ects of an environmental
campaign conducted by a private group.
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consumption behavior is introduced in the model.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 3 we set up the model,
in Section 4 we develop the country-specic equilibrium analysis. In Section 5
we compare the results for low income vs high income country. In Section 6 we
provide the welfare analysis.
3 The Model
Consider a vertically di¤erentiated market with two variants of the same good.
Close in spirit to the models of vertical di¤erentiation, we state that the perfor-
mance of the variant i, with i = L;H determines its intrinsic or hedonic quality
qi. Accordingly, qH > qL: variant H has a higher intrinsic quality than variant
L. Nevertheless, as it generates polluting emissions per unit of production at
some level eH = qH , variant H represents the brown good. At the opposite,
variant L is considered as green because its emissions eL are very low, namely
eL = qL < eH : Accordingly, the environmental quality of L turns out to be
higher than that of H.
There is a continuum of consumers indexed by  and uniformly distributed
in the interval [0; b] with density 1b . Keeping the traditional interpretation from
vertical di¤erentiation models, the parameter  is proportional to the willingness
to pay (henceforthWTP) for quality, so that b denotes the maximal WTP among
consumers.13 Each consumer can buy either one unit of good H or one unit of
good L or not buying at all.
Whenever a vertically di¤erentiated setting is used to analyse an environ-
mental problem, it is generally assumed that products otherwise identical di¤er
in their emissions so that the environmental quality represents the only source
of di¤erentiation (Moraga-Gonzales and Fumero 2002, Lombardini 2005, and
García-Gallego and Georgantzís 2009, Ben Elhadj and Tarola, 2014). Here, we
assume that there are two sources of di¤erentiation: the hedonic quality qi and
the environmental quality ei and these forces are conicting. In particular, we
assume that consumers display hedonic preferences in that they care about the
hedonic quality or pure performance of the good they consume. Nevertheless,
they feel that by buying brown goods they can be perceived among peers as bad
citizens. At the opposite, buying green goods may provide a social benet in that
they are perceived as responsible citizens. So, they feel socially/psychologically
frustrated (resp. satised) when consuming the brown good (resp. green good).
As the source of this feeling is social and/or psychological, both the frustra-
tion and the satisfaction increase with the environmental quality gap between
variants. Indeed, the lower the emissions coming from variant i compared with
variant j, with i 6= j, the more signicant the contribution to the environment
from consumers buying qi and thus the better their social image. On the con-
trary, the more polluting variant i w.r.t variant j, the more detrimental the
behavior of consumers buying this variant i and so the more blameworthy their
13Under the assumption on density, the population of consumers is always constant. See on
this Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis (2009).
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image. It is worth noting that, at the opposite, from a social welfare viewpoint,
the relative environmental quality of a variant would not play any role, being
rather the absolute level of emissions eL and eH , the reference point of a social
planner.
In order to capture the role of these feelings, we assume that the utility
from consumption is a¤ected by both the variants hedonic quality qi and the
environmental quality gap between variants (eH   eL). Formally, the indirect
utility of consumer type  writes as:
U () =
8<: qH   pH    (eH   eL) , if she buys the high quality good,qL   pL +  (eH   eL) , if she buys the low quality good,
0, if she refrains from buying.
We add to the traditional component of the indirect utility function (qi   pi)
a further ingredient, namely  (eH   eL) with i 6= j, such that the utility of
buying a variant can be magnied (in the case when  (eH   eL) is added to the
traditional terms) or rather decreased (when   (eH   eL) is subtracted) by the
environmental characteristics of the variant i compared with the alternative j.
So, when considering the term j (eH   eL)j, it is not the level of emissions per
se to determine the utility of consuming a variant. Rather, as both the green
and the brown variants are intended here as positional goods, it is the relative
pollution coming from them to a¤ect consumers utility. This component of
the utility function immediately derives from the relative preferences approach,
where the utility of an outcome for a player in a game depends on player is
own payo¤ compared with the others made available in the market.14 In the
perspective of relative preferences, the parameter , with   0 measures the
intensity of the relative dimension of consumption:15 the higher , the stronger
the relative (or social) preferences with respect to the hedonic ones.16 For sake
of simplicity and without any loss of generality, we can assume that  = 1.17
From the above formulation of the utility function, taking into account that
(eH   eL) = (qH   qL), the consumer indi¤erent between buying the low quality
good and not buying at all is:
L =  +
pL   qH
qL
=
pL   (qH   qL)
qL
: (1)
The consumer indi¤erent between buying the low quality good and the high
14See Ben Elhadi and Tarola (2014) for a deep discussion of this approach and its possible
application to the environment.
15 In our work, we use the terms social and relative as synomimous as both of them recall
that consumption has a social dimension and as a such the resulting satisfaction also depends
on the characteristics of the community where it takes place.
16The extreme case  = 0 reduces the model to the traditional vertical di¤erentiation
framework with hedonic preferences as unique drivers for buying.
17Of course, we could also state that  > 0 without normalizing the parameter to 1. How-
ever, this assumption would not bring any further insight to the model while making the
welfare analysis by far more cumbersome.
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quality good is:
H = 2 +
pH   pL
qH   qL =
pH   pL + 2 (qH   qL)
qH   qL : (2)
Note that, given prices, the market share of L increases in . Indeed, ceteris
paribus, the consumer that is indi¤erent between not buying at all and buying
the low quality (L) moves to the left due to , while the one indi¤erent between
buying the low quality and the high quality (H) moves to the right. Note also
that due to the social component of consumption, even though the lower bound
of the market is zero, the market can be covered a priori. Typically, in a
vertically di¤erentiated model, whenever the lowest willingness to pay is 0; the
market can never be covered. As rms are not allowed to price discriminate,
they should quote a nil price for meeting the marginal consumer  = 0, as this
latter would get a non positive utility from consuming at some positive price.
Accordingly, either they would get zero market share at a positive price, or a
positive market share at zero price. In either case, the equilibrium prots would
be zero. Here, on the contrary, consumer of type  = 0 can have a positive
utility from buying L if  (qH   qL) > pL. Thus, it can be protable for the
green producer to cover the market at equilibrium, thereby serving even the
consumer with the lowest willingness to pay.
We assume that prot functions of rm H and L write, respectively:
H = xH  pH ,
L = (pL   c)xL:
with xi denoting the demand faced by rm i, and c > 0 is the cost per unit of
green production. In the above formulation, it is implicitly stated that produc-
tion costs for rms only come from producing an environmentally friendly good.
Otherwise, one could imagine that there exists a cost function ci = hi+Ei where
hi denotes the hedonic-quality specic cost borne by rm i, with hH > hL and
Ei the environmental quality specic cost, with EH < EL.18 As it is reason-
able that hH > hL always holds, the only way to get cH < cL is to assume
that (EL   EH) > (hH   hL). Without any loss of generality, we can write
cL > cH = 0.19
Before going through the possible equilibria, we make the following assump-
tion that holds throughout the paper.
Assumption 1
18Of course, the case when cH > cL has been largely treated in the literature on vertical
di¤erentiation (Cremer and Thisse 1994). Thus, we disregard it.
19One may wonder why we do not introduce some xed costs to capture the role of green
technologies in production. Admittedly, when the quality is mainly related to investments
in new technologies or in R&D, then the assumption of xed quality-specic costs can be
reasonable. Still, a xed cost does not a¤ect a price game: when competing in price, a xed
cost has already been sunk and accordingly it is neglected when computing the best reply
functions of rms.
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b > b  c (2qH   qL)
qL (qH   qL) : (3)
Assumption 1 ensures a su¢ ciently large consumersheterogeneity and it will
help reducing the conditions that we have to take into account for an equilibrium
to exist.20
We develop the analysis considering in turn two di¤erent scenarios, depend-
ing on the values of the parameter b. To this aim, we consider the following
threshold value of b:21 eb  cqH
(qH   qL)2
(4)
First, we consider that b < ~b, thereby moving to the alternative case with b 1 ~b.
In the seminal paper on vertical di¤erentiation by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979),
the parameter b representing the willingness to pay for a variant is linked to the
net income at disposal of consumers: consumers with the highest willingness to
pay are those having highest per-capita income. Borrowing this interpretation,
we can develop a market-specic analysis thereby identifying how this market
feature a¤ects the equilibrium conguration. In particular, when assuming that
b < ~b, one can imagine that the equilibrium analysis is set for low-income
countries ( or regions), namely countries with a low income dispersion and low
average income. At the opposite, when b 1 ~b the analysis is performed for
high-income countries, namely incomes with high average per capita income.
4 The equilibrium analysis
We will show in the following that, depending on the parametersvalues, di¤er-
ent market equilibrium congurations may arise. In order to solve the model, we
compute the price equilibrium candidates corresponding to each market congu-
ration and provide the parameter constellations for which candidates e¤ectively
yield the corresponding market outcomes.22
4.1 Low-income countries
Let us rst consider the case where b 2 [b;~b], thereby focusing on low-average per
capita income. Typically, in a vertical di¤erentiated setting, absent production
costs, there is always room in the market for two rms if the market is not a
natural duopoly.23 Further, when the lowest willingness to pay in the market is
equal to zero, rms never nd it protable to cover the market. Accordingly, a
20Removing such an assumption does not change the main results of our paper.
21 In the following section we will clarify where does this value come from.
22This is standard in models of vertical di¤erentation. See Wauthy (1996) for more details.
23The upper bound to the number of rms which can coexist at equilibrium with positive
market share and positive equilibrium prices has nothing to do with costs and only depends
on pattern of tastes and willingness to pay distribution. In particular, given a population of
consumers, identied by the parameter  2 [; ] ; 0   <  the upper bound to number of
rms is 2 so that the market is a natural duopoly i¤ 

2  1
4
; 1
2

:
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natural entry point for the analysis is assuming that both goods are in the mar-
ket and that the market is uncovered. In this industry conguration, demands
are dened as xL = H   L and xH = b   H . Given the prot functions of
rm H and rm L, respectively
H = xH  pH ,
L = (pL   c)xL,
the pair of candidate equilibrium prices can be easily obtained:
pL =
2cqH + (qH   qL) (2qH + bqL)
4qH   qL ; (5)
pH =
cqH + (qH   qL) [2bqH   (3qH   qL)]
4qH   qL : (6)
Formally, for this candidate to be an equilibrium, we need to verify that both
prices are positive and that the low quality price pL is higher than marginal
cost, namely pH > 0, p

L > c. Moreover, we have to verify that the market
is uncovered, and that both goods have positive demands: 0 < L < H < b.
From algebraic manipulations we nd that Assumption 1 su¢ ces to guarantee
that the candidate equilibrium price of the low quality variant is higher than
the marginal production cost c, namely pL > c. Also, we nd that in b 2 [b;~b]
there is room for both rms to be active in the market whenever the intensity
of relative preferences  is su¢ ciently weak. In particular, it holds that
H < b ()  <  
qH [c+ 2b(qH   qL)]
3q2H   4qHqL + q2L
, and (7)
L > 0 ()  < b  2cqH + b (qH   qL) qL2q2H   3qHqL + q2L : (8)
It follows that both the consumer that is indi¤erent between not buying and
buying the low quality good L, as well as the one indi¤erent between buying
the low quality variant and the high quality alternative H are in the market.
Also, comparing H and 

L, we nd that:
L =
 
2cqH + bqHqL + 3qHqL   bq2L   2q2H   q2L

(4qH   qL) qL ;
H =
 
2bq2H   3bqHqL   4qHqL   cqH + bq2L + 3q2H + q2L

(qL   4qH) (qL   qH) ;
H   L =
 
cqL   2cqH + bqHqL   2qHqL   bq2L + 2q2H

qH
(qL   qH) (qL   4qH) qL
where, the denominator of (H   L) is positive, while the numerator is increas-
ing in  and nil at  >   (2cqH cqL bqHqL+bq
2
L)
2q2H 2qHqL
. As  is decreasing in b and nil
at b > b, we can conclude that for any b > b, the threshold value  < 0, so that
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the inequality  >  is always satised. This proves that whenever b > b, then
H > 

L. Thus, both rms have positive market share at equilibrium with rm
H serving consumers with higher WTP, while rm L those having lower WTP,
as in the traditional setting. Further, for any  < , the inequality pH > 0 is
satised. Finally, we nd that b >  () b < eb. We can summarize the above
ndings in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 In the range where b 2 [b;eb]; the conditions 0 < L < H < b and
pH > 0; p

L > c hold whenever  < .
Notice, however, that contrary to what it is traditionally observed in a verti-
cally di¤erentiated setting, here the equilibrium price of the low hedonic quality
variant pL can be higher than the price p

H : indeed, it may well happen that
the green nature of the variants is valued by consumers more than their perfor-
mance. Ceteris paribus, this is the case when the intensity of social preferences
 is rather high. Formally:
pL ? pH ()  ? e  2bq2H   3bqHqL   cqH + bq2L(qH   qL) (5qH   qL) : (9)
It is worth remarking that the property that pL > p

H is never met when
consumers are not faced with the dilemma between hedonic quality and so-
cial/psychological driver. In the case when there is only a driver of consumption
so that the preferences write as in the traditional setting of vertical di¤erentia-
tion, the equilibrium price of the high quality variant is always higher than the
low quality price, whatever the source of the quality gap.
In order to characterize the equilibrium congurations in the range where
b 2
h
b;ebi, it su¢ ces to show that the relevant -thresholds can be ranked as
e <  < b whenever b 2 hb;ebi .
Indeed, simple algebra reveals that e 2 (0; ), and that:
b < e () b > bb  3cqH
q2H   3qHqL + 2q2L
with bb > eb. Accordingly, we can immediately conclude that whenever the inten-
sity of relative preferences is su¢ ciently low, namely  <  (where  < b), the
existence of these preferences in the range b 2 [b;eb] does not alter the market
structure compared to the traditional vertically di¤erentiated setting. Indeed,
in spite of the social component of consumption, both rms can be active at
equilibrium. However, it can determine a switch in the equilibrium price cong-
uration. In particular, we nd that whenever  2 (e; ), the equilibrium price of
the low quality variant turns out to be higher than the one of the high quality
alternative, namely pL > p

H . We say that a price switch e¤ect takes place.
Otherwise, whenever  < e, then the traditional nding with pL < pH holds.
So, we state that:
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Proposition 1 Whenever b 2 [b;eb] the unique equilibrium is a duopoly with
both producers in the market for any  2 [0; ]. Further, at equilibrium, in this
range, if  2 (e; ) the social component of consumption is so strong that the
low quality rm can quote a price higher than that quoted by the brown rival,
namely pL > p

H .
It follows from that whenever the amount of the "brown-penalty/ green-
reward" is not very signicant, namely  < , both rms can sell their variant at
equilibrium. In this range of  values, the traditional mechanisms of competition
between rms taking place in a vertically di¤erentiated market are not modied
so that at the duopoly equilibrium, the market is uncovered. Nevertheless,
contrary to the traditional nding holding in vertical di¤erentiation where the
price of the low quality variant is always lower than the one of the high quality
product, the existence of  can determine a switch in the ranking of equilibrium
prices so that the low quality rm can charge a higher price than the high
quality rival. It is worth noting that, the higher the threshold value e, the
higher is b: the set of -parameters where the traditional prices structure holds
(so that pH > p

L) becomes larger, the more heterogeneous the market is. The
economic intuition underlying the relation between e and b goes as follows.
The higher is b, the higher the price which can be quoted at equilibrium by
both rms. Indeed, absent any social driver of consumption, the higher is b the
more signicant is the heterogeneity in the market and thus the less stringent
is the price competition between rms; further the higher is b, the higher is the
maximal WTP of consumers for the hedonic quality. The parameter  represents
at the opposite the sensitiveness of consumers to the environmental protection:
the higher is , the more relevant for consumers is the relative environmental
quality of any variant i and accordingly the higher (resp. the lower) is the price
of the green variant (resp. the brown variant). Thus, given b, for  su¢ ciently
high, consumers privilege the environmentally friendly nature of goods with
respect to the hedonic quality, and possibly pay a higher price for the green
good than for the brown, in spite of the hedonic quality gap between variants.
On the contrary, given , whenever b is rather high, the hedonic quality of
variant H is strongly valued by consumers which accordingly may be willing to
pay a higher price for this variant than for the alternative product L, in spite
of the environmental quality gap between them. In this case, the inequality
pH > p

L holds. As immediate consequence, the higher the parameter b, the
larger the set of    values such that this typical pricesstructure pH > pL is
still met.
We next consider the case where  >  in the range where b 2 [b;eb]. While
in the case when  < ; there is still room in the market for both producers,
this is no longer true whenever   . In particular, from (7), we know that
the condition for H < b (or p

H > 0) is that  is su¢ ciently low, namely  < .
In the range of  parameters where   , the high-quality rm is so strongly
penalized by its brown nature that it can no longer be active in the market and
pH = 0. As a consequence, the low quality producer is now a monopolist. Notice
that, this threshold value  is increasing in b: the higher is b, the larger is the
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set of  parameters such that both producers can stay active in the market and
the smaller is the set of  values where a monopoly equilibrium is observed.
In this monopoly setting, the indi¤erent consumer L is dened again by (1).
However, the demand for the good L is now given by xL = b   max
n
0; ML
o
.
Superscript M refers to the monopoly case. From standard computations, we
nd that the equilibrium monopoly price is:24
pML =
1
2
[c+  (qH   qL) + bqL]: (10)
At this monopoly equilibrium, the market can be either uncovered (namely
0 < ML < b) or covered (namely 
M
L < 0 < b), depending on the intensity of .
In particular:
Lemma 2 In the range where b 2 [b;eb], the condition 0 < ML < b holds for any
 2 [; M ], where M 
c+ bqL
qH   qL . On the contrary, 
M
L  0 < b holds
whenever  > M .
Proof. Algebraic calculations reveal that: (i) ML > 0 ()  < M , and
M >  in the relevant interval region b 2 [b;eb]. Also, (ii) b > ML when
 >
c  bqL
qH   qL . As  >
c  bqL
qH   qL , then the condition such that b > 
M
L always
holds when  > .
The economic intuition of the above Lemma goes as follows. Whenever the
social dimension of consumption is not su¢ ciently strong, then it is not prof-
itable for the green producer to cover the market. The reverse holds when the
intensity of relative preferences is high, namely  > M : in this circumstance,
the WTP of the marginal consumer is so high to induce the green rm to extend
the market coverage to him/her. This leads to the second proposition of our
paper:
Proposition 2 Whenever b 2 [b;eb] and   , the unique equilibrium is a
monopoly with only the low-green quality rm in the market. Moreover, at this
equilibrium the market is uncovered in the range of  2 (; M ), while it is
covered when   M .
Combining Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 leads to the following result:
Proposition 3 In the range of parameters where b 2 [b;eb], there is room in
the market for both producers whenever  < . At this duopoly equilibrium, the
market is uncovered and in the region where e <  <  equilibrium prices are
such that pL > p

H > 0. On the contrary, whenever   , then the high quality
but brown producer can no longer stay active in the market which is consequently
24 It is worth remarking that while the high quality rm is no longer active in the market,
it still plays a role. Indeed, the candidate equilibrium price pML depends on the quality gap
between variants (qH   qL).
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monopolized by the low quality but green rival. At this monopoly equilibrium,
the low quality rm covers the market for any   M , whereas for  2 (; M ),
the monopoly market is uncovered.
The main message conveyed by Proposition 3 is that if the social component
of consumption is su¢ ciently strong, then it may cause the exit of the high-
brown quality good from the market. Indeed, in this case consumers value
so much the green nature of the goods that they are not willing to buy the
brown product, whatever its performance (and thus its hedonic quality) and
the market is monopolized by the green rm. Further, note that at equilibrium
in the traditional framework, when the market is dened over the interval [0; b],
the market is always uncovered because on one hand the consumer of type  = 0
would always get a non-positive utility from buying either good at some positive
equilibrium price; on the other hand a rm would get non positive prots selling
its good at a nil price to meet the consumer  = 0 if price discrimination were
not allowed. On the contrary, for very high values of , here the market can
be covered at equilibrium: because of , the lowest willingness to pay can be
su¢ ciently high to induce rm L to o¤er the variant qL to the whole set of
consumers. The social component of consumption introduces a lower bound to
the low quality equilibrium price: even the consumer with the lowest willingness
to pay is willing to pay a price corresponding to which the low quality rm nds
it protable to cover the market. We can sum up the above considerations as
follows. On one hand, for high values of , namely whenever consumers feel the
social responsibility to protect the environment, a market-monopolization e¤ect
takes place so that only the green rm can stay active in the market. On the
other hand, it may well happen that for extremely high values of , the green
monopolist extends the market coverage farther than that typically observed in a
vertically di¤erentiated setting, thereby inducing a market-coverage e¤ect. The
former e¤ect can be a priori detrimental from a welfare viewpoint, as it reduces
the number of variants in the market thus possibly raising the equilibrium price
of the goods that are still on sale; the latter e¤ect, in contrast, can be welfare-
enhancing as some consumers which traditionally refrain from buying are now
willing to purchase.
4.2 High-income countries
Let us consider now the alternative case where b > eb. As eb < bb, we analyse in
turn two regions: b 2]eb;bb] and b > bb. Recall also that the ranking between b S e
is depending on the market size: in particular, it holds that b S e () b T bb.
Let us consider rst that b 2]eb;bb] so that b > e. We will show later that the
analysis can be easily extended to the case where b > bb without changing the
main qualitative results obtained under b  bb.
Taking into account the main ingredients of the analysis performed when
b < eb, we can easily get that whenever  2 (0; b], the equilibrium is a duopoly
with both rms active in the market. Further, in this set of  parameters, the
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market is uncovered at equilibrium. Finally, in line with the result emerged in
the previous section, we still nd that depending on whether  S e, a price
switch can emerge at equilibrium. In particular, whenever  < e (resp.   e
) then the green producer (whose good has a lower performance than the rival)
can quote a price pL such that p

L < p

H (resp. p

L  pH ) and the price gap
(pL  pH) can be intended as a premium for the green rm or symmetrically as
a penalty for the dirty producer.
It is worth noting now that the main ndings observed in low-income coun-
tries cannot be extended tout court to these high-income regions. In particular,
we show in the following that, in the range of  parameters where  > b, there
is still room in the market for both producers. Still, under duopoly the market
is now covered at the limit, namely at the equilibrium L = 0. In particular,
Lemma 3 In the range where b > eb, an interior duopoly solution with covered
market cannot be sustained at equilibrium when  > b.
Proof. When  > b we would obtain that L < 0, as we know from Lemma
1. We should assume therefore that the demand for the low quality good
starts at zero. This means that xL  H . Solving the corresponding f.o.c.s
for the modied prot functions, the candidate equilibrium prices are p
0
H =
1
3
[c + 2(b   ) (qH   qL)] and p0L =
1
3
[2c + (b + 2) (qH   qL)]. Now we can
substitute into L and H and check that 
0
L < 0 < 
0
H < b. Algebraic cal-
culations reveal that 
0
L < 0 ,  >
2c+ (b  ) (qH   qL)
3qL
, while 
0
H > 0 ,
 < b +
c
2 (qH   qL) . However, the two conditions cannot be simultaneously
satised given that
2c+ (b  ) (qH   qL)
3qL
> b+
c
2 (qH   qL) , as it can be easily
ascertained. Q.E.D.
In such a case, therefore, a duopoly equilibrium with the market covered at
the limit becomes the equilibrium candidate. This candidate equilibrium con-
guration is characterized by a constrained price competition: as the market is
covered at the limit, the indi¤erent consumer L dened in (1) is set equal to
zero, and demand functions are dened as xL = H and xH = b  H . Accord-
ingly, the equilibrium price of the green good is now pCL =  (qH   qL). Then,
the best reply of the high quality rm implies pCH =
(b  ) (qH   qL)
2
. Notice
that, the optimal price of the brown rm pCH is strictly positive i¤ (b  ) > 0.
So, whenever the condition b >  is satised, there is room in the market for
both producers which accordingly cover the market at the limit. Rather, this
duopoly structure no longer holds in the case when the social component of
consumption turns out to be higher than the highest willingness to pay for the
brown good b: whenever b  , only the green rm can stay active in the market,
the brown producer being evicted. We can thus state the following:
Lemma 4 In the range where b > ~b, at equilibrium the market is monopolized
by the green producer whenever  > b.
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When the market is monopolized, we know from the analysis developed under
b  ~b that, at equilibrium it is protable for the green producer not to cover the
market for any  < M , while covering at the limit in the range of   M . So,
in this range of b parameters where b > ~b, one needs to analyse the relationship
between M and b as to conclude about the market coverage. From standard
computations, it immediately emerges that M > b , c > b (qH   2qL). As qH
can be a priori lower than 2qL, then M > b can hold. Accordingly, we can
conclude that, for  2 [b; M ] the monopoly is uncovered, while it is covered
at the limit for  > M . So, in line with the ndings emerged in the case of
low-income countries, we can observe two contrasting e¤ects deriving from :
on one hand, high values of  entails a negative market-monopolization e¤ect
such that only the green producer can stay active in the market. On the other
hand, in a subset of these values, a positive market coverage e¤ect takes place
so that the green producer is induced to cover the market, as even the poorest
consumer is willing to pay a su¢ ciently high price due to the intensity of the
social component of consumption. This leads to the following Proposition:
Proposition 4 Whenever b > eb; then for any   b, the unique equilibrium is
a duopoly. At this duopoly equilibrium, the market is uncovered for   b < b,
while it is covered for b >  > b. In contrast, whenever  > b; the brown
rm cannot be active in the market which is consequently monopolized by the
green producer. At this monopoly equilibrium, the market is uncovered for
 2 [b; M ]; while it is covered at the limit for  > M .
5 Low versus High Income countries
It is worth remarking that while there are similarities between the equilibrium
congurations arising for b  ~b and b > ~b, there exist some interesting di¤erences
between the two settings.
Indeed, quite intuitively, in both scenarios, as  increases and so the social
preference for the environment becomes more important, the green-low quality
rm is better o¤. In particular, as  takes higher and higher values, rst the
brown-high quality rm can no longer quote a price higher than the price of
the green-low quality rm (price switch e¤ect) and then, for high enough values
of , the brown rm exits the market that is consequently monopolized by the
green rm (market monopolization e¤ect). Finally, for extremely high values
of , a positive market coverage e¤ect takes place, with the green producer
selling his/her variant to the whole set of consumers in the market. However,
whenever the average WTP for quality is rather large or b > ~b, at equilibrium
the brown rm gets to stay in the market for a wider range of -parameters
than in the opposite case b  ~b.25 In words, the higher the average income b,
the higher the social component  that is needed to strand the brown rm out
of the market. In a sense, the b and  parameters "work" in opposite directions.
Another relevant di¤erence between the two scenarios is that, as long as b  ~b,
25See the proof of the next Proposition.
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under duopoly the market is always uncovered and price competition between
rms is unconstrained. This statement no longer holds when b > ~b: in this
range of b parameters, for intermediate values of , that is b   < b there
exists a duopoly equilibrium with the market covered at the limit where price
competition is constrained.
Proposition 5 In the range where b > ~b, the set of  parameters such that
a duopoly market arises at equilibrium is larger than in the alternative setting
where b  ~b.
Proof It su¢ ces to note that the inequality b >  is always satised with
b (resp. ) representing the threshold value such that for  > b (resp.
 > ) in the range where b > ~b (resp. b  ~b) the duopoly equilibrium is
replaced by a monopoly equilibrium.
Of course, one may wonder under which circumstances b ? ~b. Comparative
statics on the relevant thresholds b and ~b show that @@qH b =   c(qL qH)2 < 0,
@
@qH
eb =   (qH+qL)c
(qH qL)3 < 0 and that
 @@qH b <  @@qHeb. In words, both b and ~b
decrease with qH and eb decreases more than b.26 This allows us to state that,
ceteris paribus, the larger is the hedonic quality gap between variants, the lower
is the threshold values and the larger is the set of b parameters satisfying the
inequalities b > b and b > ~b; also, ceteris paribus, the larger is the hedonic
quality gap between variants, the narrower is the range where b  b  eb and
the wider is the range where b > ~b, that is, the set of parameters satisfying the
condition for the high-income countries scenario to be observed. Along the same
rationale, one can observe that: @@cb =
(2qH qL)
(qH qL)qL > 0 and
@
@c
eb = qH
(qL qH)2 > 0.
Further, @@cb   @@ceb = (2q2H 4qHqL+q2L)(qL qH)2qL > 0 for qH > 1:71qL and @@cb   @@ceb < 0
for qH 2 (qL; 1:71qL). Accordingly, we can conclude that ceteris paribus, the
larger is the cost gap between variants, the higher is the threshold value and the
smaller is the set of b parameters satisfying the inequalities b > b and b > ~b.
Also, for a quality gap high enough, the larger is the cost gap between variants,
the narrower is the range where b  b  eb and the wider is the range where b > ~b,
that is, it is more likely that we are in the high-income countries scenario; the
opposite holds for qHqL su¢ ciently low, that is the larger is the cost gap between
variants, the wider is the range where b  b  eb and the narrower is the range
where b > ~b, that is, it is more likely that we are in the low-income countries
scenario.
6 Institutions and environmental campaign
So far, we have characterized the di¤erent equilibrium market congurations as
a function of consumerssocial preferences  relative to their highest WTP for
26We recall for sake of exposition that b  c(2qH qL)
qL(qH qL) ,
eb  cqH
(qH   qL)2
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the hedonic quality, b. In other words, for di¤erent ranges of the parameter b,
we have depicted consumersand rmsequilibrium behaviors depending on the
value of .
In this section, we wonder whether there is room for information disclo-
sure programs providing consumers with precise data about the environmental
quality of goods on sale. By making consumers further aware of their possi-
ble contribution to global pollution via dirty shopping, these programs have a
direct e¤ect on the value of , thereby possibly changing the market structure
at equilibrium. More precisely, we assume that the policy maker can a¤ect the
relative concern to environment , by launching an environmental campaign at
some costs s
2
2 , with s  0 being the marginal cost of the campaign.27 We de-
ne the social welfare SW as the sum of consumer surplus (CS), rmsprots
(L + H), environmental damage deriving from global emissions (D), and the
costs to sustain the environmental campaign ( s22 ). Thus, we can write as
follows:
SW = CS + L + H  D   s
2
2
where
CS =
minfb;HgZ
maxf0;Lg
[(qL   pL) +  (qH   qL)] d+
bZ
minfb;Hg
[(qH   pH)   (qH   qL)] d,
and D = e  xH .28 It is worth remarking that the emissions coming from the
green good so low that they are not taken into account by the social planner in
the damage function D, regardless of the cost required for increasing consumers
awareness to respect environment.
In order to guarantee the concavity of the welfare function, we make the
following assumption on the marginal cost s of the campaign:
Assumption 2.
s > smin  (qH qL)(12q
3
H+19q
2
HqL 13qHq2L+2q3L)
qL(4qH qL)2 : (11)
In what follows we consider the case of low-income countries and the alter-
native of high-income countries in turn. In each scenario, comparing the social
welfare of the di¤erent equilibrium market congurations, we dene the relevant
emission thresholds that a¤ect the optimal level of the campaign.
27This cost structure enables to model that it becomes increasingly di¢ cult to sensitize
consumers to respect environment.
28The environmental damage is usually taken to be quadratic in the level of emissions. Our
assumption of a linear environmental damage allows us to simplify calculations and obtain
analytically tractable expression. However, the main results of our paper do not change if we
consider alternative specications, even if we would need to resort to numerical simulations.
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6.1 Low income countries
In the case of low income countries (for any b 2 [b;eb]), as long as  < , both
rms are active in the market and competition is unconstrained. The social
welfare at equilibrium as a function of  is thus as follows:
SW  () = L + 

H + CS

L + CS

H   e  xH   s
2
2
(12)
with
xL =
qH [(qH   qL) (2qH   qL)  c (2qH   qL)]
qL (4qH   qL) (qH   qL) ; x

H =
pH
(qH   qL) ;
L =
qL
qH
(qH   qL) (xL)2 ; H =
(xH)
2
(qH   qL) ;
CSL =
HZ
L
[(qL   pL) +  (qH   qL)] d = (x

L)
2
2
;
CSH =
bZ
H
[(qH   pH)   (qH   qL)] d = (x

H)
2
2
 qH

(2b+ )
 
q2H   q2L
  c (3qH + 2qL)
Maximising this welfare function, the Government nds it optimal to set  at
some level  such that:
 =
qH
 
cqHqL   12cq2H   3bq3L + cq2L + 11bqHq2L   8bq2HqL

+ e qL (4qH   qL) (3qH   qL)
s qL (4qH   qL)2   (qH   qL) (12q3H + 2q3L   13qHq2L + 19q2HqL)
:
(13)
It is worth noting that this value  is strictly positive only when the emissions
are su¢ ciently high, namely
  0 ()
e  e = qH [qLb (8qH   3qL) (qH   qL) + c (3qH   qL) (4qH + qL)]
qL (qL   4qH) (qL   3qH) :
So, given the cost of the campaign, it is socially desirable to a¤ect the consumers
involvement in environmental protection from the social welfare viewpoint only
if the damage coming from pollution is rather signicant (that is e  e). Oth-
erwise, the Government refrains from investing so that  = 0; because the cost
of the campaign does not compensate the positive e¤ect linked to the emissions
reduction. Notice also, that
   ()
e  e = qHf(qH   qL)
2
(6qH   qL) [c  b (qH + qL)] + s[c+ 2b (qH   qL)] (4qH   qL) qLg
qL (qH   qL) (3qH   qL)2
:
Finally, whenever the emissions coming from the brown good are extremely
signicant, i.e. e > e, the optimal policy is to reduce as much as possible the
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production of the polluting good so that in this market conguration the social
planner sets the optimal level of  at  = .
Accordingly, for values of e, such that e 2 (e; e), the policy intervention does
not change the market structure w.r.t. a laissez-faire case, that is the equi-
librium is an unconstrained duopoly. Looking at the equilibrium quantities in
this scenario, as one could expect we nd that @xL=@ > 0 and @x

H=@ < 0.
However, more interestingly, total output increases in . This means that the
consumer surplus unambiguously increases with this policy instrument. No-
tice that more traditional instruments like environmental taxation have often
pointed out a conict between environmental protection and market competi-
tion because of the distortive e¤ect of taxation on total output. More precisely,
the following trade-o¤ emerges in the welfare function as  increases: on the
one hand there is a positive e¤ect on the consumer surplus, on the green rms
prot and on the polluting emissions; on the other hand, there is a negative
e¤ect on the brown rms prot and on the cost of the campaign.
We next wonder whether there are values of e such that the policy maker
has incentives to further push  so as to reach the monopoly outcome. Recall
indeed that for  > , the unique equilibrium is a monopoly with only the low-
green quality rm in the market, the brown rm being no longer active in the
market. In this case, i.e.,  2 (; M ), equilibrium quantities and the welfare as
a function of  are:
xML =
c  bqL    (qH   qL)
2qL
;
ML =
 
xML
2
qL;
CSML =
 
xML
2
2
qL;
SWM () = ML + CS
M
L   s
2
2
:
Maximising this welfare function, we nd the following optimal  level:29
M =
3 (qH   qL) (c  bqL)
3 (qL   qH)2   4sqL
:
Note however that M < , showing therefore that, under assumption 2, it is
never socially protable to set a level of  larger than . So,  represents the
maximum investment in environmental campaign carried out by the government.
We further check that the government always prefers to leave an " ! 0 to the
polluting rm, and then still have a duopoly with an amount of emissions that
goes to zero instead of letting the green rm monopolize the market.
We gather the above results in the following Proposition.
Proposition 6 Whenever b 2 [b;eb], the policy maker optimally a¤ects con-
sumers environmental concern and sets a positive level of  =  as long as
29Given assumption 2, this welfare function in concave in .
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e  e. This optimal level of relative preferences  increases with the emissions
level e and reaches the maximum at  for any e  e.
The following picture represents the optimal level of  in the low income
countries:
Figure 1 : optimal campaign in the low income country
0 
e


e
e 







6.2 High income countries
In the case of high income countries (for any b > eb), as long as  < b, both rms
are active in the market and competition is unconstrained. As in the previous
case, in this range of parameters it is optimal to undertake some campaign
thereby setting  =  dened in (13). As before  takes positive values for
e  e. However, we here need to verify that  < b. We nd that, this holds
when
e < e0 = (qH qL)[b(qH qL)(q
2
H 8qHqL+2q2L) cqH(13qH qL)]+s(4qH qL)[2cqH+bqL(qH qL)]
(3qH qL)(2q2H 3qHqL+q2L)
:
It follows that, when e 2 (e; e0], the optimal investment level is b >  > 0, and
the social welfare is given by (12). However, in the case when  is driven by the
policy maker towards the limit b , the resulting market share of the polluting
rm is " ! 0: In particular, at  = b; the social welfare corresponds to the
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following expression:
SW j=b = c
2qH    2cqH (qH   qL)  + b (qH   qL)2 	
2(2q2H   3qHqL + q2L)2
 = [3q2H   2q2L   qH(qL + 4s)]
 = [b(3q2H   8qHqL + 5q2L + 2sqL)  e (2qH   qL)]
	 = fb[3q3H   3q2HqL + 3qHq2L   q2L(2qL + s)]  2e(2q2H   3qHqL + q2L)g
where the emissions coming from the polluting rm are far from being irrelevant.
We next consider what happens when e > e0. In this case the policy maker
may have the incentive to set a  > b. Recall from the analysis above that for
 2 (b; b], we have a corner solution with covered market and both rms active
in the market. Social welfare at equilibrium is as follows:
SW  () = L + 

H + CS

L + CS

H   s
2
2
  exH (14)
with
xL =
1
2
(b+ ) ; xH =
1
2
(b  )
L =
1
2
(b+ ) ( (qH   qL)  c) ; H = (qH   qL) (xH )2
CSL = (x

L )
2 qL
2
; CSH =
1
8
(b  ) ((b  ) qH + 2 (b+ ) qL)
Note that in this market coverage conguration total output is xL + x

H = b,
independent of . Thus, in this case, as in the unconstrained duopoly the policy
instrument  does not have a distortive e¤ect on market competition. One can
easily verify that SW j=b = SW j=b , thus verifying the continuity of the
social welfare function. Maximising (14) with respect to , we nd the following
socially optimal value of :30
 =
2(c  e) + b(qH   qL)
7(qH   qL)  4s :
with   b , e > eC = b(qH qL)[q2H 5qHqL+2qL(2qL+s)] c[5q2H q2L 4qH(qL+s)](2qH qL)(qH qL)
and  < b , e < eC = c   b(3qH   3qL   2s) (superscript C indicates the
threshold values for the corner case). Note that e0 < eC . It follows that, in
e 2 (e0; eC ], the optimal solution  is not viable as it would take a value lower
than b. In such an interval, therefore, the optimal investment is b. Finally, for
each value of e > eC , the government decides to set  = b. Similarly to the
previous scenario, it is never socially desirable to further push  so as to let the
green rm to monopolize the market. Quite intuitively, indeed, as  ! b the
market share of the brown rm tends to zero and so the polluting emissions do,
30Assumption 2 su¢ ces to guarantee the concavity of SW  (). More precisely, it is concave
when s > 7(qH   qL)=4; but such a value is lower than s.
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however competition is preserved. Moreover, pushing  beyond b would imply
to change the market from a duopoly with covered market to a monopoly with
uncovered market.
We gather the above results in the following Proposition.
Proposition 7 Whenever b > eb, the policy maker optimally a¤ects consumers
environmental concern and sets a positive level of  =  as long as e  e.
This optimal level of relative preferences  increases with the emission level
e until  = b for e 2 (e0; eC ]. For higher values of e, it is socially desirable
to further increase  so as to move from an interior duopoly equilibrium to a
duopoly equilibrium with the market covered at the limit, that is the optimal 
is  = b for any e  eC .
The following picture represents the optimal level of  in high income coun-
tries:
Figure 2 : optimal campaign for the high income country
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Comparing the two settings of low versus high income countries, similar-
ities and di¤erences emerge. First, in both cases, we can state that the en-
vironmental campaign as policy instrument does not generate any trade-o¤
between competition authorities (aiming at fostering competition) and envi-
ronmental authorities (aiming at reducing pollution): as  increases, one ob-
serves the reduction of the emissions but not at the cost of milder competition.
Nevertheless, the two settings di¤er for the predicted maximal investment in
environmental campaign: the optimal investment in low-income countries 
can be lower than the one observed in high income counterparts  = b, as
  qH [c+2b(qH qL)]
3q2H 4qHqL+q2L
< b () c < b(qL qH)2qH . At rst sight this result is
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counterintuitive, however it reects the trade-o¤ that characterize our consumer
preferences, that is the trade-o¤ between the WTP for the hedonic quality, mea-
sured by b and the WTP for the environmental quality measured by . In high
income countries (higher values of b), the WTP for the hedonic quality is higher
than for low-income countries: as a result, in order to convince consumers to
switch to the green good it is necessary to invest more in the social component
of consumption.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered a game between a clean and a dirty pro-
ducer o¤ering variants complying at di¤erent level with the social norm that
a green behavior is a byword of good citizenship. We have disentangled the
equilibrium properties of the model under the assumption that there exist two
sources of di¤erentiation, the performance of the good determining its hedo-
nic quality and the pollution emissions determining its environmental quality.
Further, we have assumed that the high (resp. low) hedonic quality variant is
less (resp. more) complying with the norm compared with the alternative. So,
an environmentally friendly good satises the consumersdesire to stand out
as good citizens, while frustrating them for the poor performance of the good.
We have developed the analysis while taking into account some specic features
of the market, in particular consumers dispersion and average income. The
existence of a conict between the value attributed to the hedonic quality and
the positional satisfaction deriving from an environmentally friendly good can
change the equilibrium market conguration compared to the traditional setting
of vertically di¤erentiated goods: in some circumstance, while both producers
are active in the market at equilibrium, the one providing the low hedonic qual-
ity good can quote a higher price than the rival because of the green nature of
his/her good. Thus, at this duopoly equilibrium, a price switch is observed com-
pared with the typical nding that the high quality good is sold at higher price
than the competing variant. Furthermore, we nd that whenever the intensity
of the relative preferences is su¢ ciently high, a market-monopolization e¤ect
takes place so that only the green rm can stay active in the market, the dirty
competitor being pushed away. At this monopoly equilibrium conguration, for
extremely high intensity of relative preferences, the green monopolist extends
the market coverage farther than that typically observed in a vertically di¤er-
entiated setting, thereby inducing a market-coverage e¤ect. Finally, we have
characterized the optimal campaign to sensitize consumers to damage from pol-
lution, when it is undertaken by a policy maker. We have proved that although
the level of investment in campaign is country-specic, in the case when it is
socially benecial to invest in environmental campaign, the policy maker can
induce pollution abatement while preserving competition whatever the country
where the campaign takes place.
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